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Abstract
This paper describes a model with sticky prices, search frictions and hours-clearing wages that
provides rm di¤erentiation across several dimensions: price, output, wage, employment and hours
per worker. The connection between pricing and hiring decisions results in rm-level employment
uctuations that depend upon sticky prices, search costs, demand elasticity and labor supply elas-
ticity. The calibrated model is able to match average US industrial employment volatility when
assuming a small industrial size, providing one possible answer to Shimer (2005a)s puzzle.
Keywords: search frictions, sticky prices, industrial employment.
JEL codes: E3, J2, J3, and J4.
1 Introduction
The aggregation procedure used to obtain macroeconomic series implies the compensation between
positive and negative entries. Such "smoothing action" leaves out information on uctuations that
cancel out each other. Therefore, the aggregation procedure can be misleading for the business cycle
analysis because it provides a downward-biased measure of short-run uctuations. Let us see this
point with a simple example.
One economy with one million workers is formed by only two industries, A and B. Each industry
initially employs half a million workers. During the same period of time, A industry su¤ers a destruc-
tion of 5,000 jobs while B industry is able to create the same amount of 5,000 jobs. Thus, we would
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say that the level of total (aggregate) employment remains constant at 1 million workers, with a 0%
variability. However, since employment fell by 1% in A industry and rose by 1% in B industry, the
average variability of employment is 1%. That is the result obtained using the industrial perspective.
If we do it in terms of aggregate employment, we would say that variability of employment was 0%.
Apparently, the former conclusion is more correct than the latter because there were actually 10,000
people changing their job status, which by the way is 1% of total laborforce in the example.
Obviously, business cycle statistics obtained from model-based simulations can su¤er from the
same volatility reduction if the analysis lacks from any industrial disaggregation. This paper examines
the implications of calculating statistics of volatility using series of industrial employment instead of
aggregate employment. We do it both in the US data and in a calibrated New Keynesian model. Our
results show that the standard deviation of employment is signicantly undervalued both in US data
and in the model when measured from aggregate employment compared with the values obtained as
the average standard deviation of industrial employment.
Shimer (2005a) argues that employment volatility is unrealistically low in a model with search and
matching frictions of the kind obtained by Mortensen and Pissarides (1994). This criticism is known
as Simers puzzle. The New Keynesian model with search frictions may be able to boost employment
uctuations through the price dispersion that results from sticky prices. However, seminal papers
such as Walsh (2005) and Trigari (2009) assume a representative rm that makes no distinction of
employment levels across rms.1 Unlike most related literature, this paper describes extensively the
model outlined in Casares (2008) where pricing and hiring decisions are connected at the rm level.2
As a result, rm-specic employment dynamics depend upon rms relative price.
Such rm-specic employment equation was used here to study the business cycle properties of
industrial employment. This paper explores the determinants of volatility on rm-specic employ-
ment dynamics from a variety of factors that include search frictions, price rigidities and households
preferences. More concretely, rm-level employment variability depends positively on the rate of job
destruction, the degree of price stickiness (bounded to some upper threshold) and the elasticity of
demand. On the contrary, employment volatility falls with a higher elasticity of search costs and also
1The absence of employment di¤erentiation across rms leads to a theoretical inconsistency. How can it be assumed
that there are costs of search and matching when all rms are identically either hiring or ring workers? Can search
frictions cause unemployment uctuations if all rms have the same employment dynamics? If all of them did wish
to hire more workers search costs might be negligible whereas in times of job destruction searching for a job must be
really useless. The representative rm model does not seem to be compatible with a search-and-matching theory of
unemployment. Firm di¤erentiation is required to explain why workers change from one industry to another. In other
words, hiring and employment dynamics must be rm specic. This is one basic point of this paper.
2A remarkable contribution by Thomas (2008) discusses how the lack of connections between pricing and employment
dynamics in New Keynesian models is due to assuming a retailer-producer dual structure.
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with an increase in the elasticity of labor supply.
Hence, this paper proposes a New Keynesian model in which rms di¤erentiate in many dimensions:
they have a specic selling price, they have a di¤erent number of employees, they o¤er a particular
number of vacancies, they produce a di¤erent quantity of output, they organize di¤erent shifts of
hours at work, and they pay a di¤erent nominal wage. Such a model is built assuming nominal
rigidities (sticky prices) and real rigidities (search frictions) in a way that provides this multi-dimension
dispersion at rm level. The model delivers both macroeconomic and microeconomic relationships.
The macro model may serve for the conventional business cycle analysis or monetary/scal implications
that is not analyzed here. The focus of the paper is located on the rm-level relationships that serve for
a sectorial analysis, in particular to nd out the determinants of industrial employment uctuations.
The results of this quantitative analysis can help to understand the volatility observed in US industrial
employment.
The rest of the paper contains ve more sections. Section 2 is empirical; it describes short-run
uctuations of industrial employment taken from recent US data. As documented there, employment
variability across US industries is high and mildly procyclical. Section 3 describes the details and
derivation of the New Keynesian model discussed in Casares (2008) that combines sticky prices with
search frictions and hours-clearing wage setting. Section 4 introduces a baseline calibration that is used
in the study of rm-specic and industrial employment uctuations. Section 5 examines the volatility
and cyclical correlation of employment in a double perspective: either taking a single measure of
aggregate employment or by looking at industrial employment upon alternative industrial sizes. The
analysis includes a comparison with the characteristics of employment uctuations observed in US
data. Section 6 concludes the paper with the review of major results.
2 US employment uctuations
Despite of the generally accepted view (the so-called "Great Moderation"), US industrial data show
that the last decade and a half has been a period of high employment variability. The Bureau of
Labor Statistics (BLS) provides a wide range of sectorial employment data, with several levels of
disaggregation.3 According to the published data, there have been two short business cycles in the
past fteen years: the Information Technologies (IT) expansion and decline from 1994 through 2002
and the real-estate boom during the low interest-rate period (2002-2006) which led to the nancial
crisis in 2007. Thus, the number of employed people in the industry of Computer systems design
and related services rose in 400,000 persons in 1998-2000; however, half of those jobs were destroyed
during the IT crisis su¤ered in 2001 and 2002. The second wave of employment expansion came
3Data are available from the BLS website at http://www.bls.gov/data/#employment .
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with the housing boom that created almost 1,2 million jobs in the construction sector from 2003 to
2005. However, the burst of the housing bubble swept away almost 1 million jobs during the years
2007 and 2008. Besides, 47,200 jobs were destroyed in real estate agencies and 174,000 jobs in the
Credit intermediation and related activities industry. Meanwhile, steady employment creation has
been observed in industries related to education, health, and also in services provided at bars and
restaurants. Many of these changes are lost out of track when building the aggregate series of Total
Private Employment (TPE).
I did download BLS monthly employment data from industries that occupied more than 400,000
workers in 1994. The sample covers 67 industries that account for approximately 89% of the series of
TPE also reported in the BLS website. Most of them correspond to the 3-digit categories dened by
the North American Industry Classication System (NAICS). For a business cycle analysis, quarterly
series were obtained by making three-month average values. Then, the series were logged and detrended
using a Hoddrick-Prescott (HP) lter. Analogously, aggregate series of output and employment were
obtained by taking logs and then making the HP lter to original series of Real Gross Domestic
Product and TPE.4 The business cycle volatility can be measured by the standard deviation of the
resulting series relative to the standard deviation of output, whereas the coe¢ cient of linear correlation
with output provides the extent of procyclicality. These two dimensions were examined in US data
taking a direct measure of aggregate employment (TPE) or, alternatively the average across industrial
employment.5 Table 1 reports the results:
Table 1. US employment uctuations, 1994-2008
Total Private Employment (TPE)
Standard deviation, relative to output: 1.07
Correlation with output: 0.78
Industrial Employment
Average standard deviation, relative to output: 1.67
Average correlation with output: 0.35
The numbers are di¤erent depending upon the treatment given to employment data. When num-
bers of employed workers are just added up to obtain TPE, the standard deviation of employment
is similar to that of output (just 7% higher as shown in Table 1) while both series present a strong
positive correlation. These numerical ndings can be conrmed by looking at Figure 1 that plots the
4The series of Real GDP was retrieved from the FRED database of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis,
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/ .
5A weighted average of the numbers obtained in the 67 US industries was computed by dening individual weigths
as the fraction of Total Private Employment that takes each particular industry. This applies to both averages of the
standard deviation and the correlation with output.
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Figure 1: Fluctuations of Total Private Employment (TPE) and Real GDP (Output) in the US
during the period 1994:1-2008:4. Both series have been logged and HP-ltered to extract ths cyclical
component.
business cycle series of US employment and output.
The results are quite di¤erent in the case of taking industrial employment data. On the one
hand, the standard deviation rises substantially (by 56% from 1.07 to 1.67 as indicated in Table 1).
On the other hand, the coe¢ cient of correlation with output falls. Therefore, the average values
of the standard deviation and the output correlation do not coincide with the numbers obtained
using aggregate employment. As expected, the lack of a smoothing action coming from the overall
aggregation makes employment be both more volatile and less procyclical. Figure 2 displays a selection
of US industrial employment uctuations in several plots that collect industries of the same sector.
The numbers of the complete set of industries are provided in Appendix I.
There are industries where employment presents a much higher variability than output and others
where it is the opposite. This information is blurred away when doing the aggregation. Hence, it can
be observed in Figure 2 that the metal, electronics or motor industries have much greater employment
uctuations than output. Other industries that show high employment variability belong to the
Construction sector or to Professional Services. By contrast, there are industries with low employment
variability, such as the ones related to Education and Health as displayed in Figure 2. The complete
industrial employment data (see Appendix I) show ten industries with a standard deviation more than
5
Figure 2: Employment business cycle uctuations across selected sectors and industries, 1994-2008.
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three times higher than the one of output, while quantitatively important industries, such as Hospitals
and Food Manufacturing, report a much lower standard deviation that is approximately one half of
that of output. The weighted average comes up with a number equal to 1.67, signicantly higher than
1.07 obtained with the series of aggregate employment (TPE).
Regarding the correlation of industrial employment with output, we nd again many di¤erences
across US industries. There are strongly procyclical industries (such as Furniture, Truck Transporta-
tion and Clothing); a large group of industries are mildly procyclical and there is also a few industries
where employment is countercyclical (notably, Hospitals and Educational Services). Actually, there
are 9 industries out of the total of 67 that get a negative coe¢ cient of correlation between uctuations
of employment and aggregate output. Once the weighted average is computed, the mean correlation
is at 0.35, substantially lower than 0.78 obtained when using the measure of aggregate employment
(TPE).
Summarizing, the traditional way of looking at business cycle uctuations with aggregate macro-
magnitudes looses information that is quantitatively relevant for the business cycle analysis. The
industrial data analyzed here shows that the aggregation procedure downsizes employment volatility
and rises employment procyclicality.
3 A New Keynesian model with rm-specic employment
I will now introduce a model that allows employment di¤erentiation across rms with the objective
of use it later for the analysis of industrial employment uctuations. The model was already sketched
in Casares (2008) and this section is devoted to carefully describe the elements of the model and the
way structural equations are obtained. The key ingredients that determine employment dynamics
in the model are sticky prices a la Calvo (1983) and search-and-matching frictions as in Mortensen
and Pissarides (1994). The rest of the model belongs to the standard New Keynesian framework.
The supply-side of the economy is formed by many heterogeneous rms that operate in monopolistic
competition as described in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). Firms may set an specic price while the amount
of output produced is constrained by the Dixit-Stiglitz demand curve
yt(i) =

Pt(i)
Pt
 
yt; (1)
where yt(i) is output produced at rm i, Pt(i)=Pt is the ratio of price set by rm i over the average
price level, yt is the level of aggregate output, and  is a constant elasticity parameter. Firms have two
forms of varying labor input: at the extensive margin with a one-period lag of adjustment (number
of workers employed, nt+1(i)) and in the intensive margin during the current period (number of hours
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per worker demanded, hdt (i)). Assuming constant capital, and the same marginal productivity on both
margins, the production function of the i rm is
yt(i) =

exp(zt)h
d
t (i)nt(i)
1 
; (2)
with 0 <  < 1 and zt denoting an AR(1) technology shock. After substituting (2) into (1), the
amount of output produced by the i-th rm is demand determined as follows
exp(zt)h
d
t (i)nt(i)
1 
=

Pt(i)
Pt
 
yt: (3)
Unlike seminal New Keynesian models with unemployment such as Walsh (2005) and Trigari (2009),
pricing and hiring decisions are not separated in this model.6 The same monopolistically competitive
rm that sets prices is making decisions on vacancies and new jobs. Hiring new workers is costly for
the rm as in the Mortensen-Pissarides literature. In particular, a rm must post a vacancy in the
market and wait for a matching of that vacancy with some available worker. Thus, job creation has
the following search cost function that depends on the number of vacancy postings, vt(i),
c(vt(i)) = c0 (vt(i))
1+c1 :
Many papers assume c1 = 0:0 to imply linear search costs (Walsh, 2005; Christo¤el and Kuester,
2008). In addition, the hiring process requires time for the worker to nd the job and for the rm to
ll the vacancy. This is typically modeled by saying that new hires are incorporated at the rm one
period after the matching takes place. The matching function delivers the number of new jobs that
result from the search process of unemployed workers for vacancy postings
mt = (ut)
 (vt)
1  ;
where mt is the number of economy-wide new matchings, ut = 1   nt = 1  
Z
nt(i)di is the number
of unemployed people seeking for a job, vt =
Z
vt(i)di is the total number of vacancies posted, and
0 <  < 1 is a technology parameter that provides the relative contribution of the pool of unemployed
workers in making a match. Subsequently, the probability for a rm of making a new hiring out of a
vacancy posting is
qt =
mt
vt
=
(ut)
 (vt)
1 
vt
=

ut
vt

:
Meanwhile, job destruction is determined by a constant separation rate.7 It means that all rms must
face some exogenous job destruction at the separation rate, s. In turn, employment evolves for the
6As shown by Casares (2008) and Thomas (2008), the lack of separation between pricing and hiring is not an innocuous
assumption.
7Hall (2005b) and Shimer (2005b) claim that the separation rate is quite stable in the US and has little e¤ect on
employment uctuations.
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i-th rm as indicated by the following dynamic equation
(1  s)nt(i) + qtvt(i) = nt+1(i); (4)
which says that next periods employment is the predetermined sum of the jobs that remain after
current period, (1   s)nt(i), plus the number of new hirings, qtvt(i), obtained as the product of the
number of vacancies posted by its probability of lling them with a match.
The impossibility of instantaneous hiring obliges the rm to call for changes in the amount of
hours, hdt (i), when output must be adjusted to meet current demand conditions. The other inputs of
the production function (2) cannot be used to adjust the level of production because they are either
exogenous (the technology shock, zt) or predetermined (employment, nt(i)). If market conditions are
favorable and the rm seeks to increase production right away, current employees will work more hours
until the arrival of new employes in the next period. For the specic i rm, the demand for hours is
obtained by turning (3) around to yield
hdt (i) =
1
nt(i)

Pt(i)
Pt
  
1  y
1
1 
t
exp(zt)
: (5)
Households are identical and large as in Merz (1995). The representative household supplies a
continuum of di¤erentiated labor services. Those household members working pool their labor income
to be split up evenly in a way that conveys the same consumption for the employed members as for
the unemployed members. With a separable utility function specication
U(ct; nt(i); h
s
t (i)) =
c1 t
1    	
Z 1
0
nt(i)
[hst (i)]
1+
1 + 
di
the supply of hours is
hst (i) =

Wt(i)
Pt
t
 1

; (6)
where t is the marginal utility of consumption and 1 is the Frisch labor supply elasticity.
Wage determination takes place at the intensive margin of current employees. As in Casares (2008),
nominal wages are rm-specic and linked to the supply and demand of hours. The "hours-clearing"
wage is the hourly rate that equates the willingness of the worker to spend time at the rm with
the need of workhours for the rm.8 This is a di¤erent treatment from the standard Nash-bargained
wage setting in the extensive margin that is used in the Mortensen-Pissarides literature.9 Making
8Krause and Lubik (2007) use the expression "notional wage" for the Nash-bargained nominal wage.
9The Nash-bargained wage setting is also present in recent New Keynesian models that incorporate search frictions
such as Walsh (2005), Krause and Lubik (2007), Christo¤el and Kuester (2008), and Trigari (2009).
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hdt (i) = h
s
t (i) with (5) and (6) and solving for the hours-clearing nominal wage, Wt(i), it is obtained
Wt(i) =
Pt
t
0@ 1
nt(i)

Pt(i)
Pt
  
1  y
1
1 
t
exp(zt)
1A ; (7)
which reveals that the hours-clearing nominal wage depends on two rm-specic variables, the price
and the level of employment, in both cases a¤ecting negatively due to the reduction in the demand
for hours.
Next, it is time to examine the optimizing behavior of monopolistically competitive rms. All
rms seek to maximize intertemporal prots. The i-th rm maximizes
Et
1X
j=0
t;t+j
"
Pt+j(i)
Pt+j
1 
yt+j   Wt+j(i)
Pt+j
hdt+j(i)nt+j(i)  c0 (vt+j(i))1+c1
#
subject to constraints (3) and (4) in period t and future periods. Future prots are discounted at the
stochastic discount factor t;t+j for j > 0. The nominal wage is rm-specic and determined by (7).
Supposing that the i rm receives the Calvo signal to price optimally, the rst order condition that
must satisfy is
Et
1X
j=0
t+j
j
"
(1  )

(1 + )jP t (i)
Pt+j
 
yt+j(i)
Pt+j
+  t+j(i)

(1 + )jP t (i)
Pt+j
  1
yt+j(i)
Pt+j
#
= 0,
(8)
where  is the Calvo probability of not being able to price optimally, Et is the rational expectation
conditional to the lack of optimal pricing in future periods, P t (i) is the optimal price set in period t,
and  t+j(i) is the rm-specic real marginal cost in period t+ j. The rst order condition regarding
the choice of nt+1(i) is
  Ett;t+1
240@ @Wt+1(i)@nt+1(i)
Pt+1
hdt+1(i) +
@hdt+1(i)
@nt+1(i)
Wt+1(i)
Pt+1
1Ant+1(i) + Wt+1(i)
Pt+1
hdt+1(i)
35
+ Ett;t+1
@yt+1(i)
@nt+1(i)
 t+1(i)  't(i) + Ett;t+1

(1  s)'t+1(i)

= 0; (9)
where 't(i) and  t+1(i) are the Lagrange multiplier respectively attached to constraints (4) in period
t and (3) in period t+ 1: The optimality condition on the demand for hours, hdt (i),
Wt(i)
Pt
nt(i)  @yt(i)
@hdt (i)
 t(i) = 0;
serves to identify  t(i) as the real marginal cost
 t(i) =
Wt(i)
Pt
nt(i)
@yt(i)
@hdt (i)
: (10)
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Meanwhile, the partial derivatives @Wt+1(i)@nt+1(i) ,
@hdt+1(i)
@nt+1(i)
, and @yt+1(i)@nt+1(i) can be computed using equations (7),
(5), and (3) referring to period t+ 1. All yield
@Wt+1(i)
@nt+1(i)
=  Wt+1(i)
nt+1(i)
;
@hdt+1(i)
@nt+1(i)
=  1h
d
t+1(i)
nt+1(i)
; and
@yt+1(i)
@nt+1(i)
= (1  ) yt+1(i)
nt+1(i)
:
The substitution in equation (9) of these three partial derivatives and also the expression for  t+1(i),
obtained when moving (10) one period ahead, leads, after a massive simplication, to the following
optimality condition for employment
Ett;t+1

(1 + )

hdt+1(i)
Wt+1(i)
Pt+1

= 't(i)  Ett;t+1

(1  s)'t+1(i)

: (11)
The interpretation of 't(i) can be extracted from the rst order condition on the number of vacancies
posted in period t; vt(i), which says
 c0(1 + c1) (vt(i))c1 + 't(i)qt = 0;
dening the shadow value of a job, 't(i), as the marginal costs of a vacancy divided by the probability
of making a match:
't(i) =
c0(1 + c1) (vt(i))
c1
qt
: (12)
Thus, the interpretation of the optimal hiring equation (11) can be done in standard microeconomic
terms: the marginal benet expected for a new job on the left-hand side (measured as the expected
saving of hours to accommodate the new employee) must be equal to the marginal cost saved when
dropping the last vacancy posted on the right-hand side.
Equations (8), (11) and (12) jointly determine the dynamic behavior of prices and employment.
Loglinearizing techniques can be used to nd linear approximations that collect the period-to-period
evolution of these variables. Using standard notation, the hat symbol on top of a variable refers to the
log deviation of that variable from the steady-state level. For example, bnt+1 = log  nt+1n  represents
the log deviation of aggregate employment from steady state in period t+1: In addition, tilde-topped
variables denote relative variables measured as log deviations with respect to the current aggregate
variable. Hence, the relative price of rm i in period t is written as ePt(i) = logPt(i)   logPt. After
doing the algebra, log-linear structural equations that govern aggregate and rm-specic employment
dynamics are (proof available in Appendix II)
 

(1+)c1
(+s)s +
(1 s)2c1
(+s)s
 bnt+1 = Etbht+1 + Et bwt+1 + (1+)c1(1 s)(+s)s bnt + (1 s)c1(+s)s Etbnt+2 (13)
+ (1+)(1+c1)+s bqt + (1+)+s Etbt+1   (1 s)(1+c1)+s Etbqt+1:
and ent+1(i) = 2ent(i)  3 ePt(i), (14)
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with the following analytical expressions for the undetermined coe¢ cients 2 and 3
2 =
(1+)c1(1 s)
(+s)s
1++
(1+)c1
(+s)s +
(1 s)2c1
(+s)s  2
(1 s)c1
(+s)s  1(1 )

(1+)
1  +3
(1 s)c1
(+s)s
 , and (15a)
3 =


(1+)
1  +3
(1 s)c1
(+s)s

1++
(1+)c1
(+s)s +
(1 s)2c1
(+s)s  2
(1 s)c1
(+s)s  1(1 )

(1+)
1  +3
(1 s)c1
(+s)s
 . (15b)
As for pricing dynamics, the relative price for a rm that was able to set the price optimally in
period t is eP t (i) = eP t   1ent(i); (16)
with the following analytical solution for the 1 coe¢ cient (see proof available in Appendix II)
1 =
(1 )
(1 2)

1+
(+)
1   
3
1 2
 : (17)
Fluctuations of the aggregate price level are determined by the following equation (see proof in Ap-
pendix II) eP t = 1  
1 + (+)1    31 2
Et
1X
j=0
jjb t+j + Et 1X
j=1
jjt+j : (18)
Combining (18) with eP t = 1 t from the Calvo pricing scheme leads to
t =
(1 )(1 )


1+
(+)
1   
3
1 2
Et
1X
j=0
jjb t+j + 1  Et 1X
j=1
jjt+j ;
where one can do t   Ett+1 to reach the following New Keynesian Phillips curve
t = Ett+1 +
(1 )(1 )


1+
(+)
1   
3
1 2
 b t: (19)
As pointed out in Casares (2008), hours-clearing wages and search frictions inuence ination dynamics
through the additional term in brackets entering the denominator of (19), i.e.   31 2 , which might
be either positive or negative depending upon convexity (c1 > 0:0) or concavity (c1 < 0:0) on the
search costs function introduced above.
The joint dynamics of pricing and employment decisions bring the employment equation (13) and
the ination equation (19). Other equations of the model are the IS curve obtained from the utility
function with constant consumption elasticity () introduced above
bct = Etbct+1   1 (Rt   Ett+1); (20)
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a monetary policy rule that provides reactions of the nominal interest rate to both the rate of ination
and the real marginal cost with a component of interest-rate smoothing10
Rt = (1  R)
h
t + y
b ti+ RRt 1; (21)
the denition of log deviations of the aggregate real marginal cost,
b t = bwt + bnt   byt + bht; (22)
log uctuations of output around the steady-state level implied by the production technology (2)
byt = (1  )bnt + bht + zt ; (23)
log uctuations of the aggregate real wage consistent with hours-clearing wages and constant elasticities
of consumption () and hours () in the utility function
bwt = bht + bct; (24)
log uctuations of unemployment from the loglinearization of ut = 1  nt
but =  nubnt; (25)
where nu is the employment-to-unemployment ratio in steady state; log uctuations on aggregate
vacancies obtained from the aggregation of the loglinear version of (4)
bvt = 1sbnt+1   1 ss bnt   bqt; (26)
the loglinear probability of posting a successful vacancy obtained from taking logs in the denition of
qt =

ut
vt

bqt = but   bvt; (27)
the log-linearized overall resources constraint
byt = cybct + c0(v)1+c1y (1 + c1)bvt; (28)
and the denition of log deviations of the intertemporal discount factor
Etbt;t+1 =  (Rt   Ett+1): (29)
Thus, the macro model consists of twelve equations, (13) and the set (19)-(29); that provide solution
paths for the twelve endogenous variables: byt, bct, Rt, t, b t, bwt, bnt+1, bht, but, bvt, bqt; and bt;t+1. Firm-
specic equations (14) and (16) together with eP t = 1 t determine paths for rm-level employment
and optimal pricing, ent+1(i) and eP t (i).
10Fluctuations of the real marginal cost are proportional to the output gap in canonical New Keynesian models.
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4 Determinants of rm-specic employment uctuations
For a baseline calibration of the structural parameters, numerical values are borrowed from the recent
literature. Regarding search frictions technology, I follow Walsh (2005) to set a 10% separation rate,
s = 0:10, the matching technology share is at  = 0:5, and the function that measures the costs of
posting new vacancies is slightly convex and close to the linear case with c1 = 0:25: As for the scale
parameter c0, I set the value c0 = 0:085 in order to imply that search costs take 1% of total GDP as
in Gertler and Trigari (2009).
In the utility function, consumption elasticity is quite standard at  = 2. Meanwhile, the elasticity
on labor disutility is also held at  = 2:0 which leads to a low Frisch labor supply elasticity ( 1 = 0:5)
as suggested by numerous empirical studies (see Altonji ,1986; Card, 1994; and Blundell and Macurdy,
1999). The steady-state rate of intertemporal preference is assumed at  = 0:005, which implies a 2%
annualized real interest rate in steady state.
The production function (2) incorporates the parameters of the real business cycle literature.
Therefore, we take the usual labor-share coe¢ cient,  = 0:36, with the AR(1) technology shock, zt,
characterized by a 95% serial correlation and a 0.7% standard deviation of the innovations. Such
calibration results in output volatility similar to that observed in US business cycle.11
Pricing conditions are governed by Calvo probability of non-optimal pricing set at  = 2=3, which
leads to having an average frequency of posting optimal prices equal to nine months, as suggested by
the empirical evidence reported in a recent paper by Nakamura and Steinsson (2009).12 The Dixit-
Stiglitz demand elasticity is  = 11:0 to imply a 10% mark-up in steady state. Finally, the Taylor-type
monetary policy rule is implemented with the original coe¢ cients suggested by Taylor (1993),  = 1:5
and y = 0:5=4, together with a high interest-rate smoothing coe¢ cient, R = 0:8.
Recalling (17), (15a) and (15b), the baseline calibration gives rise to the following numbers for 1,
2 and 3
1 = 0:04, 2 = 0:74; and 3 = 2:32;
which bring a weak and negative dependence of employment on optimal pricing (setting 1 = 0:04 in
equation 16), a moderate employment inertia (setting 2 = 0:74 in equation 14); and a strong negative
inuence of the relative price on next periods employment (setting 3 = 2:32 in equation 14).
The model can illustrate the determinants of rm-specic employment uctuations. In particular,
it could be examined how the values of 2 and 3 entering (14) are inuenced by changes in the
numerical values assigned to structural parameters. Due to the rich interactions embedded in the
model, employment uctuations depend upon a variety of elements such as labor market rigidities,
11The standard deviation of output in the model is 0.98% while in US data plotted in Figure 1 is 0.93%.
12Bils and Klenow (2004) nd a signicantly shorter price duration of around 5 months.
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Figure 3: Determinants of inertia (2) in rm-specic employment uctuations. The position of 
corresponds to the baseline calibration.
pricing conditions and households preferences. Looking at the analytical solutions (15a) and (15b),
2 and 3 receive some inuence from variations in search costs elasticity (c1), the separation rate (s),
price rigidities (), Dixit-Stiglitz demand elasticity (), the rate of intertemporal preference (), labor
supply elasticity ( 1), and the production technology coe¢ cient (). Except for , the sensitivity of
these structural parameters on the persistence and variability of rm-specic employment is examined
next. Figure 3 shows the e¤ects of moving the structural parameters on the inertia coe¢ cient 2
(which collects the response of next period employment to current employment in relation 14). The
elements of the model that bring frictions to the labor market, i.e. the search costs elasticity and
the job destruction rate, are the most inuential on the determination of persistence of rm-specic
employment uctuations. If the labor market presents higher search costs (increase in c1) there is
more inertia on employment dynamics. Intuitively, since hiring is more costly new jobs last longer.
On the other hand, a faster job destruction (an increase in s) reduces rms employment inertia.
A high separation rate makes hiring needs and vacancy postings more frequent, which drives rm-
specic employment less dependent from the past. Interestingly, neither sticky prices nor demand
elasticity shape signicantly the inertial component of rms employment (see central cells of Figure
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Figure 4: Determinants of sensitivity to relative prices (3) in rm-specic employment uctuations.
The position of corresponds to the baseline calibration.
3). Finally, labor supply elasticity plays some role on rm-specic employment. A higher labor
supply elasticity increases employment inertia because wages loose variability and the incentives for
employment changes are smaller.
The inuence of relative prices on rm-specic employment is measured by the 3 coe¢ cient in (14).
Figure 4 shows numerical values of this coe¢ cient at some intervals of the structural parameters.As
observed there, a rise in price stickiness (), the job destruction rate (s), or the Dixit-Stiglitz demand
elasticity () increase 3 making relative employment more sensitive on relative prices. These three
elements augment the (negative) responsiveness of job creation to relative prices. Thus, stickier prices
lead to higher dispersion on prices, output and also a greater di¤erentiation in hiring decisions across
rms. Similarly, a high Dixit-Stiglitz elasticity requires larger supply-side changes in response to
relative prices. By contrast, any increase in labor supply elasticity ( 1) or search cost elasticity (c1)
reduces the impact of relative prices on relative employment because the former cuts the marginal
benet of hiring (due to less real wage variability) and the latter raises the marginal cost of hiring
(due to higher costs on vacancy posting).
Variability of rm-specic employment is the result of combining its inertial component with the
16
sensitivity to relative prices. A direct measure of rm-specic volatility can be obtained by computing
the unconditional standard deviation of relative employment. Recalling Calvo pricing and the rm-
level dynamic equations (14) and (16), one can obtain the following expression for the standard
deviation of relative employment13
std(en) =r 23+2223(1 2) 1
1 22 2123(1 )(1 2) 1
std
 eP .
Using Woodfords (2003, pages 694-696) result on Calvo-type staggered pricing, the unconditional
standard deviation of relative prices is approximated by the following expression
std
 eP =q 
(1 )2 std () ;
where std () is the unconditional standard deviation of economy-wide ination. The last two equations
can be used to obtain numerically the standard deviation of rm-specic employment depending on
2, 3,  and the standard deviation of ination. Figure 5 provides the results.
As dhown in Figure 5, increasing search costs implies a signicant reduction in the standard de-
viation of relative employment as hiring is more costly. By contrast, the separation rate a¤ects in
the opposite direction. A higher separation rate induces greater employment variability because job
duration is shorter and workers change jobs more often. Price stickiness and demand elasticity also
shape upwards employment volatility (see central plots of Figure 5). When price rigidities are in-
creased, rm-specic employment gains volatility due to the greater variability of rm-specic output,
hours and wages. This nding is reversed when nominal rigidities are so severe that overall prices and
ination have little volatility (as the value of  approaches its right-side end in Figure 5). At a minor
extent, relative employment volatility also rises with a higher demand elasticity that would increase
dispersion on the quantities of output, hours and hiring policies across rms. Finally, the structural
parameters that bring households preferences have some impact on relative employment volatility.
Thus, a higher labor supply elasticity would cut employment volatility (due to less wage variabil-
ity) whereas a higher rate of intertemporal preference would slightly increase the size of employment
uctuations.
5 A New Keynesian analysis of industrial employment uctuations
Let us dene one industry as a group of rms. Thus, industrial employment can be obtained as the
average employment across all rms that belong to that particular industry. Using the employment
dynamic equation (14), ent+1(i) = 2ent(i)  3 ePt(i), the uctuations of industrial employment can be
13See Appendix III for the proof.
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Figure 5: Determinants of volatility in relative employment. The position of corresponds to the
baseline calibration.
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obtained as the average uctuation of all ms that belong to that industry. The number of rms per
industry determines the size of each industry.
Using a computer, I can create articial series taking random draws from a normal distribution
to generate the technology shock. For each observation, I assume that there are 10,000 rms in the
economy, all of them pending from the Calvo market signal that determines whether the rm is able
to set the optimal price or not. Thus, 10,000 Calvo signals can be randomly generated from a (0,1)
uniform distribution. Every rm receives a single draw. Recalling the baseline Calvo probability
 = 2=3, if the number received is higher than 2/3, the rm could price optimally according to (16)
eP t (i) = eP t   1ent(i) = 1 t   1ent(i):
Otherwise, the rm would raise its price by the steady-state rate of ination which would leave its
relative price as follows ePt(i) = ePt 1(i)  t:
The outcome on relative prices will be inserted in (14) to calculate next periods relative employ-
ment of the rm. The aggregation of all relative employments of the rms that belong to the same
industry would yield the measure of relative industrial employment. As a introductory exercise, it
may be interesting to take a look at Figure 6. It is a graphical display of a simulated 140-quarter
economy where there are industrial employment uctuations in four possible types of industries: very
small single-rm industries (10,000 industries), small 10-rm industries (1,000 industries), medium-
size 100-rm industries (100 industries), and large 1000-rm industries (10 industries). Obviously, the
large number of industries makes their employment uctuations overlap in the plot. The "smoothing
action" becomes clear; employment volatility falls as more rms are collected in one industry (from
top to bottom in Figure 6). More rms per industry, deeper smoothing when making the industrial
average and less employment variability as a result. Hence, the scale of the vertical axis shrinks as
the industrial size is raised, i.e. industrial variability falls. By contrast, employment in smaller indus-
tries brings more markedly uctuations. In the example displayed in Figure 6, technology improved
in the second half of the sample. The most severe changes in employment occur in 1-rm indus-
tries that cut employment by almost 50% during that technology boom. This situation represents
the evolution of employment in those rms that were not able to set the optimal price during the
periods of the technological innovation. Subsequently, they were posting high relative prices which
made them be countercyclical as they cut production and employment. The bottom plot of Figure
6 shows uctuations of employment when there are only 10 industries in the economy (holding 1,000
rms each industry). In this case, we can see how most industries increase employment during the
technology-driven expansion (periods 70 through 100). The aggregation procedure makes employment
uctuations be more procyclical.
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Figure 6: Output and industrial employment uctuations in one simulated economy with di¤erent
industrial sizes.
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Next, we will examine employment uctuations both at aggregate and industrial level (using the
alternative industrial sizes introduced above). The results will be compared with the piece of em-
pirical evidence of the US economy discussed in Section 2. The economy contains 10,000 rms that
are assigned to some industry under four industrial sizes 1/10000, 10/10000, 100/10000 and 1000/10000.
Computer-generated technology shocks shape business cycles for 140 quarters.14 The simulation ex-
ercise was done 500 times and the means of both the average standard deviations (relative to output)
and the average coe¢ cients of correlation with output were calculated across industries for the four
alternative industrial sizes. I also computed the standard deviations of aggregate employment (relative
to output) and its coe¢ cient of correlation with output. Table 2 displays the results:
Table 2. Model-based employment uctuations.
Aggregate Employment
Standard deviation, relative to output: 0.04
Correlation with output: 0.78
Industrial Employment
Industrial size
1/10000 10/10000 100/10000 1000/10000
Average standard deviation, relative to output: 2.35 0.76 0.25 0.09
Average correlation with output: 0.06 0.05 0.12 0.33
After reviewing Table 2, it is clear that the decision on whether to study employment uctuations
from aggregate employment or from industrial employment is relevant for the business cycle analysis.
Thus, the industrial disaggregation of employment uctuations increases employment volatility and
reduces procyclicality compared to the standard treatment of aggregate employment uctuations.
Using aggregate employment, the results indicate that industrial employment has little variability
(0.04 relative to output) and a high cyclical correlation (0.77). These numbers are in deep contrast
with US data (see Table 1 for the comparison). That is the case of the New Keynesian model with
search frictions and no rm di¤erentiation. Then, employment volatility is low as documented by
Shimer (2005a)s puzzle15 and there is an excessive correlation with output due to the lack of industrial
segmentation.
If the approach switches to using industrial employment, the New Keynesian model provides a
better t to the data. As a general nding, industrial employment is more volatile and less procyclical
14The initial 40 observations are discarded in order to make a random start for the calculation of second-moment
statistics.
15Shimer (2005a) claims that the standard search and matching model is not able to generate the observed volatility
of vacancies relative to unemployment. The standard deviation of the vacancy-unemployment ratio is around 20 times
larger than the standard deviation of productivity in the US economy and the model brings a much lower number.
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than aggregate employment. Moreover, small-sized industries increase employment standard deviation
and reduce the correlation with output. For example, Table 2 reports that in an economy that had
industries with just one rm the average standard deviation of industrial employment is 2.39 times
that of output, whereas the average cyclical correlation is positive and close to zero (0.06). As the
industrial size is raised the standard deviation of industrial employment falls and the correlation with
output tends to increase. The limit case would be a single industry formed by all (10,000) rms
in which numbers would coincide with those obtained for aggregate employment, showing very little
employment volatility and a strong correlation with output.
Table 3. Model-based employment uctuations with less price stickiness ( = 0:50).
Aggregate Employment
Standard deviation, relative to output: 0.05
Correlation with output: 0.76
Industrial Employment
Industrial size
1/10000 10/10000 100/10000 1000/10000
Average standard deviation, relative to output: 1.09 0.36 0.12 0.06
Average correlation with output: 0.08 0.12 0.30 0.62
As a nal exercise, employment uctuations in the model have been examined under weaker price
rigidities. To do that, I did repeat the simulation procedure setting the Calvo probability at a lower
value,  = 0:50, which shortens the average time without optimal pricing from three to two quarters.
Table 3 provides statistics on employment uctuations under less price rigidities. The results indicate
that reducing price stickiness has two e¤ects on industrial employment uctuations. First, volatility
falls due to much less variability in relative prices (rms tend to set more similar prices with less setting
rigidities). Secondly, the correlation between industrial employment and output rises, especially in
cases with large industries.
6 Conclusions
US employment data show that the "smoothing action" applied by the aggregation procedure reduces
employment volatility and increases the correlation with output. Therefore, the average volatility of
industrial employment is higher than that of aggregate employment, while the correlation with output
turns lower taking data of industrial employment than using the series of aggregate employment. This
paper has shown that the "smoothing action" found in the data is also present in employment uc-
tuations obtained from model-based simulations. Actually, the business cycle analysis of employment
22
from an industrial perspective in a New Keynesian model is more successful than the one made with
the standard approach that ignores rm-specic employment dynamics. Such conventional New Key-
nesian model with search frictions is not capable to replicate that degree of employment dispersion
which goes in line with Shimer (2005a)s puzzle on search models. Besides, it predicts an excessive
cyclical correlation of employment. Nevertheless, the modied model with rm-level employment dif-
ferentiation provides a better t to US data. Then, the variability of average industrial employment
obtained depends on the industrial size assumed in a range that goes from lower volatility than in US
data (with small industrial size) to higher volatility than in US data (assuming large industrial size).
Reducing price stickiness lowers industrial employment volatility and increases the correlation with
output.
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Appendix I. US industrial employment data.
Volatility and cyclicality of US industrial employment ranked from high to low volatility, 1994-2008
St.Deviation Correlation
relative to output with output
Employment services (0.0339) 4.98 0.88
Computer systems design and related services (0.0111) 4.97 0.60
Telecommunications (0.0119) 4.05 0.39
Home health care services (0.0076) 3.80 -0.40
Computer and electronic products (0.0163) 3.62 0.45
Securities, commodity contracts, investments (0.0077) 3.20 0.57
Construction of buildings (0.0163) 3.11 0.78
Motor vehicles and parts (0.0121) 3.07 0.73
Air transportation (0.0056) 3.06 0.37
Wood products (0.0059) 3.05 0.78
Furniture and related products (0.0063) 2.84 0.88
Machinery (0.0138) 2.81 0.49
Couriers and messengers (0.0059) 2.75 0.25
Primary metals (0.0058) 2.74 0.63
Mining (0.0059) 2.69 0.03
Electrical equipment and appliances (0.0054) 2.64 0.57
Accounting and bookkeeping services (0.0086) 2.57 0.47
Specialty trade contractors (0.0427) 2.57 0.80
Fabricated metal products (0.0168) 2.55 0.67
Heavy and civil engineering construction (0.0094) 2.51 0.67
Electronics and appliance stores (0.0054) 2.46 0.64
Apparel (0.0048) 2.39 0.35
Management and technical consulting services (0.0072) 2.23 0.25
Nonmetallic mineral products (0.0054) 2.09 0.77
Architectural and engineering services (0.0126) 2.02 0.52
Note: Numbers in parenthesis indicate the weights used to calculate the average. These weights are dened as
the ratio between the sample mean of industrial employment and Total Private Employment.
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(Cont.). Volatility and cyclicality of US industrial employment ranked from high to low volatility, 1994-2008
St.Deviation Correlation
relative to output with output
Warehousing and storage (0.0055) 2.00 0.74
Business support services (0.0078) 1.95 0.35
Truck transportation (0.0141) 1.93 0.75
Plastic and rubber products (0.0090) 1.89 0.74
Motion picture and sound recording industries (0.0038) 1.84 -0.04
Building material and garden supply stores (0.0120) 1.82 0.57
Publishing industries except Internet (0.0098) 1.80 0.62
Wholesale trade of durable goods (0.0318) 1.79 0.71
Support activities for transportation (0.0054) 1.74 0.70
Sporting goods, hobby, book, and music stores (0.0067) 1.74 0.47
Credit intermediation and related activities (0.0275) 1.74 0.27
Clothing and clothing accessories stores (0.0139) 1.73 0.79
Accommodation (0.0186) 1.72 0.76
Department stores (0.0171) 1.71 0.36
Printing and related support activities (0.0077) 1.67 0.67
Furniture and home furnishings stores (0.0055) 1.62 0.77
Management of companies and enterprises (0.0183) 1.51 0.76
Electronic markets and agents and brokers (0.0069) 1.47 0.52
Arts, entertainment, and recreation (0.0182) 1.29 0.44
Rental and leasing services (0.0065) 1.20 0.69
Paper and paper products (0.0058) 1.14 0.44
Real estate (0.0140) 1.12 0.57
Utilities (0.0063) 1.08 -0.26
Services to buildings and dwellings (0.0165) 1.08 0.74
Motor vehicle and parts dealers (0.0189) 1.03 0.49
Health and personal care stores (0.0201) 1.02 0.41
Note: Numbers in parenthesis indicate the weights used to calculate the average. These weights are dened as
the ratio between the sample mean of industrial employment and Total Private Employment.
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(Cont.). Volatility and cyclicality of US industrial employment ranked from high to low volatility, 1994-2008
St.Deviation Correlation
relative to output with output
Social assistance (0.0095) 1.02 0.20
Membership associations and organizations (0.0282) 0.97 -0.38
Repair and maintenance (0.0125) 0.95 0.25
Educational services (0.0261) 0.89 -0.56
Plastic and rubber products (0.0095) 0.88 0.24
Insurance carriers and related activities (0.0232) 0.84 0.35
Chemicals (0.0098) 0.84 0.48
Legal services (0.0113) 0.78 0.35
Wholesale trade of nondurable goods (0.0211) 0.73 0.60
Food and beverage stores (0.0302) 0.73 0.37
Food services and drinking places (0.0876) 0.62 0.38
Hospitals (0.0428) 0.55 -0.58
Nursing and residential care facilities (0.0276) 0.55 -0.71
Food manufacturing (0.0159) 0.52 -0.17
Personal and laundry services (0.0129) 0.39 0.21
O¢ ces of physicians (0.0197) 0.36 -0.46
Weighted averages 1.67 0.35
Note: Numbers in parenthesis indicate the weights used to calculate the average. These weights are dened as
the ratio between the sample mean of industrial employment and Total Private Employment.
Appendix II. Derivation of employment and price equations at both rm-specic and aggregate
levels.
Optimality in rm-level hiring decisions is determined by equations (11) and (12), subject to the
employment accumulation constraint (4). The substitution of both (12) and the equation correspon-
dent to (12) for period t+ 1 in equation (11) yields
Ett;t+1
h
(1 + )

hdt+1(i)
Wt+1(i)
Pt+1
i
= c0(1+c1)(vt(i))
c1
qt
  Ett;t+1
h
(1 s)c0(1+c1)(vt+1(i))c1
qt+1
i
; (A1)
which can be loglinearized to reach
Etbhdt+1(i)+Et cWt+1(i) cWt+1+Et bwt+1 = 1++s hc1bvt(i)  bqt   Etbt+1i  1 s+s [c1Etbvt+1(i)  Etbqt+1] ;
(A2)
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where bwt+1 = cWt+1   bPt+1 is the log deviation of the aggregate real wage in period t + 1 from its
steady-state level, and both  and s are the steady-state rates of discount and exogenous separation.16
Meanwhile, taking logs in (7) and subtracting the aggregated log of the nominal wage yield17
fWt(i) =  ent(i)  
1  
ePt(i), (A3)
where tilde-topped variables denote relative variables measured as log deviations with respect to
aggregate levels, for example, fWt(i) = cWt(i)  cWt = logWt(i)   logWt. Similarly, taking logs in (5)
and subtracting the aggregated log of hours leads to the following relative demand for hours
Etbhdt+1(i) =  ent(i)  1   ePt(i) + Etbht+1: (A4)
Moving (A3) and (A4) one period forward leads to expressions for Etbhdt+1(i) and EtfWt+1(i) =
Et
cWt+1(i) cWt+1 such as
Etbhdt+1(i) =  ent+1(i)  1  Et ePt+1(i) + Etbht+1, and
Et
cWt+1(i) cWt+1 =  ent+1(i)  
1  Et
ePt+1(i),
which can be inserted in the loglinear optimality condition (A2) to obtain
  (1 + )Etent+1(i)  (1+)1  Et ePt+1(i) + Etbht+1 + Et bwt+1 =
1+
+s
h
c1bvt(i)  bqt   Etbt+1i  1 s+s [c1Etbvt+1(i)  Etbqt+1] : (A5)
Log deviations of current vacancies, bvt(i), determine those on the number of new employees through
the employment accumulation equation (4). Loglinearizing (4) and rearranging terms, it is reached
bvt(i) = 1
s
bnt+1(i)  1  s
s
bnt(i)  bqt = 1
s
(ent+1(i) + bnt+1)  1  s
s
(ent(i) + bnt)  bqt: (A6)
Both (A6) and its corresponding expression one period ahead for Etbvt+1(i) are substituted in (A5) to
yield
 
h
(1 + ) + (1+)c1(+s)s +
(1 s)2c1
(+s)s
i ent+1(i) + (1+)c1(1 s)(+s)s ent(i) + (1 s)c1(+s)s Etent+2(i)
  (1+)1  Et ePt+1(i) + Etbht+1 + Et bwt+1 =
(1+)c1
(+s)s +
(1 s)2c1
(+s)s
 bnt+1  (1+)c1(1 s)(+s)s bnt  (1 s)c1(+s)s Etbnt+2  (1+)(1+c1)+s bqt  (1+)+s Etbt+1+ (1 s)(1+c1)+s Etbqt+1:
(A7)
16 It should be noticed that in steady state t;t+1 = (1 + )
 1.
17This results was already reported in Casares (2008) without any published proof.
27
This last expression implies a certain relationship between rm-specic employment and pricing.
In particular, next periods relative employment is negatively related to the rms expected relative
price.18 In addition, there is some inertial pattern for employment accumulation that makes next
periods hiring be dependant upon the current level of employment, with a positive sign of inuence.
Therefore, it is fair to guess that relative employment dynamics are governed by one expression of the
following kind ent+1(i) = 2ent(i)  3 ePt(i), (A8)
where 2 and 3 are undetermined coe¢ cients to be found below. Using (A8) to infer Etent+2(i), it is
obtained
Etent+2(i) = 2ent+1(i)  3Et ePt+1(i),
which after being plugged in (A7) results in
 
h
(1 + ) + (1+)c1(+s)s +
(1 s)2c1
(+s)s   2 (1 s)c1(+s)s
i ent+1(i) + (1+)c1(1 s)(+s)s ent(i)
 

(1+)
1  + 3
(1 s)c1
(+s)s

Et ePt+1(i) + Etbhdt+1 + Et bwt+1 =
(1+)c1
(+s)s +
(1 s)2c1
(+s)s
 bnt+1  (1+)c1(1 s)(+s)s bnt  (1 s)c1(+s)s Etbnt+2  (1+)(1+c1)+s bqt  (1+)+s Etbt+1+ (1 s)(1+c1)+s Etbqt+1:
(A9)
Moreover, it is assumed that rm-specic relative optimal pricing is connected to economy-wide relative
optimal prices and relative employment through the following equation19
eP t (i) = eP t   1ent(i); (A10)
which implies that the relative optimal price expected for next period is Et eP t+1(i) = Et eP t+1 1ent+1(i)
and that the expected relative price Et ePt+1(i) that appears in (A9) is20
Et ePt+1(i) =  (logPt(i)  Et logPt+1)+(1 )Et eP t+1(i) =   ePt(i)  Ett+1+(1 )Et eP t+1   1ent+1(i) ;
(A11)
where Ett+1 = Et logPt+1   logPt is expected next periods ination. Calvo pricing also implieseP t = 1 t and, subsequently, Et eP t+1 = 1 Ett+1 that can be used in (A11) to yield
Et ePt+1(i) =  ePt(i)  1(1  )ent+1(i);
18The reader can see that both Etent+1(i) and Et ePt+1(i) are premultiplied by a negative sign on the left hand side of
(A7).
19A high level of employment would reduce the hours-clearing nominal wage as indicated by (7), which would bring
lower real marginal costs and a lower optimal price set by the rm.
20Recalling the aggregation of Calvo-type sticky prices Pt =
h
(1  ) [P t ]1=(1 ) +  [(1 + )Pt 1]1=(1 )
i1 
, where
P t =
Z
P t (i)di is the average optimal price.
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which it is inserted in (A9) to obtain
 
h
(1 + ) + (1+)c1(+s)s +
(1 s)2c1
(+s)s   2 (1 s)c1(+s)s   1(1  )

(1+)
1  + 3
(1 s)c1
(+s)s
i ent+1(i)+ (1+)c1(1 s)(+s)s ent(i)
  

(1+)
1  + 3
(1 s)c1
(+s)s
 ePt(i) + Etbhdt+1 + Et bwt+1 =
(1+)c1
(+s)s +
(1 s)2c1
(+s)s
 bnt+1  (1+)c1(1 s)(+s)s bnt  (1 s)c1(+s)s Etbnt+2  (1+)(1+c1)+s bqt  (1+)+s Etbt+1+ (1 s)(1+c1)+s Etbqt+1:
(A12)
The aggregation of (A12) over the continuum of rms leads to the macro relationship that determines
employment uctuations
(1+)c1
(+s)s +
(1 s)2c1
(+s)s
 bnt+1 = Etbhdt+1 + Et bwt+1 + (1+)c1(1 s)(+s)s bnt + (1 s)c1(+s)s Etbnt+2 (A13)
+ (1+)(1+c1)+s bqt + (1+)+s Etbt+1   (1 s)(1+c1)+s Etbqt+1;
which is equation (13) in the main text. Another consequence of (A12) is that the analytical expressions
for the undetermined coe¢ cients 2 and 3, consistent with the assumed relationship (A8), are
2 =
(1+)c1(1 s)
(+s)s
1++
(1+)c1
(+s)s +
(1 s)2c1
(+s)s  2
(1 s)c1
(+s)s  1(1 )

(1+)
1  +3
(1 s)c1
(+s)s
 , and
3 =


(1+)
1  +3
(1 s)c1
(+s)s

1++
(1+)c1
(+s)s +
(1 s)2c1
(+s)s  2
(1 s)c1
(+s)s  1(1 )

(1+)
1  +3
(1 s)c1
(+s)s
 ,
that respectively become expressions (15a) and (15b) in the main text.
For the price dynamics equation, we start by making a log-linear approximation to (8) that renders
bP t (i) = (1  )Et 1X
j=0
jj
 bPt+j + b t+j(i) ; (A14)
where log deviations from steady state of rm-specic real marginal costs can be obtained from (10)
as follows b t+j(i) = cWt+j(i)  bPt+j + bnt+j(i)  byt+j(i) + bhdt+j(i): (A15)
Subtracting log deviations of the aggregate real marginal cost, b t+j = Z b t+j(i)di, from (A15), it
yields b t+j(i) = b t+j +fWt+j(i) + ent+j(i)  eyt+j(i) + ehdt+j(i);
where using (A3) for fWt+j(i), the log-linear version of (1) for eyt+j(i), and (A4) for ehdt+j(i), we get
b t+j(i) = b t+j   ent+j(i)  ( + )1   ePt+j(i): (A16)
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Using (A16) in (A14), it is obtained
bP t (i) = (1  )Et 1X
j=0
jj
 bPt+j + b t+j   ent+j(i)  (+)1  ePt+j(i) ;
where subtracting the log of the aggregate price level, bPt, on both sides of the equation, we reach
eP t (i) = (1  )Et 1X
j=0
jj
 b t+j   ent+j(i)  (+)1  ePt+j(i) + jX
k=1
t+k
!
: (A17)
The rational expectation of future relative prices, conditional to optimal pricing in t and the lack of
optimal price adjustments in the future, is Et ePt+j(i) = bP t (i) Et bPt+j = bP t (i)  bPt + bPt  Et bPt+j =eP t (i) + EtPjk=1 t+k = eP t (i) + EtPjk=1 t+k. Using this result, (A17) becomes
1 + (+)1 
 eP t (i) = (1  )Et 1X
j=0
jj
 b t+j   ent+j(i) + 1 + (+)1  Et jX
k=1
t+k
!
;
which is equivalent to
1 + (+)1 
 eP t (i) = (1  )Et 1X
j=0
jj
b t+j   ent+j(i)+ 1 + (+)1  Et 1X
j=1
jjt+j : (A18)
Next, the expected future stream of relative employment, conditional to the lack of optimal pricing can
be related to both the relative values of the optimal price and employment. Thus, it can be observed
that applying (14)
Et
1X
j=0
jjent+j(i) = ent(i) + Et 1X
j=1
jjent+j(i) = ent(i) + Et 1X
j=0
jj

2ent+j(i)  3 ePt+j(i) ;
which gets reduced to
(1  2)Et
1X
j=0
jjent+j(i) = ent(i)  3Et 1X
j=0
jj ePt+j(i): (A19)
Applying again the conditional expectation on future relative prices, Et ePt+j(i) = eP t (i)+EtPjk=1 t+k,
we have
(1  2)Et
1X
j=0
jjent+j(i) = ent(i)  3(1  ) 1
0@eP t (i) + Et 1X
j=1
jjt+j
1A ;
so that it is used in (A19) to yield
1 + (+)1    31 2
 eP t (i) =  (1 )1 2 ent(i)+(1 )Et 1X
j=0
jjb t+j+1 + (+)1    31 2Et 1X
j=1
jjt+j :
(A20)
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Recalling the proposed relation eP t (i) = eP t   1ent(i), the analytical solution for the undetermined
coe¢ cient 1 consistent with equation (A20) is
1 =
(1 )
(1 2)

1+
(+)
1   
3
1 2
 ;
that is expression (17) in the main text. Meanwhile, uctuations of the aggregate relative optimal
prices are determined by
eP t = 1  
1 + (+)1    31 2
Et
1X
j=0
jjb t+j + Et 1X
j=1
jjt+j ; (A21)
which corresponds to equation (18) in the main text.
Appendix III. Derivation of the standard deviation of rm-specic relative employment.
From equation (14), the computation of the variance of relative employment gives
var(en) = (1  22) 1 h23var( eP )  223cov(en; eP )i :
The covariance between relative employment and the relative price can be obtained from (16), the
Calvo-style pricing and eP t = 1 t
cov(en; eP ) = E hen  ePi = E hen( eP 1   ) + (1  ) eP    1eni = E hen eP 1   (1  )1eni :
Recalling the dynamics of relative optimal prices eP  given by (16), the previous expression yields
cov(en; eP ) = E h2en 1   3 eP 1  eP 1   (1  )1en2i ;
which implies
cov(en; eP ) =  (1  2) 1 h3var( eP ) + (1  )1var(en)i :
Substituting cov(en; eP ) in the expression for var(en) results in
var(en) = (1  22) 1 h23var( eP ) + 223(1  2) 1 3var( eP ) + (1  )1var(en)i
or, alternatively,
1  22   2123(1  )(1  2) 1

var(en) = 23 + 2223(1  2) 1 var( eP ):
Taking the square root of the last expression leads to the expression for the standard deviation of
relative employment
std(en) =r 23+2223(1 2) 1
1 22 2123(1 )(1 2) 1
std
 eP ;
that is displayed in Section 4 of the text.
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